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Review Essay
Responding to Gtobatization1
WILLIAM TWINING 2
ALMOST ANYONE INVOLVED WITH LAW-as practitioner, judge, reformer,
scholar, or theorist-needs to confront the question, "What are the implications
of globalization for my work?" Many go beyond that question to ask about the
broader implications for a specialized field of law, their practice, the practice of law
generally, legal theory, or the place of law in the world. It is widely acknowledged
that globalization is not entirely new, but for the past thirty years the pace and
extent of change associated with it have greatly accelerated. Not surprisingly,
there have been debates about its nature and significance. An enormous literature
has sprung up and is expanding rapidly but unevenly. There has, of course, been
an intellectual lag between the actual phenomena associated with globalization
and academic responses to them. Discussions explicitly in terms of globalization
gathered momentum in the social sciences around 1990, especially in economics,
international relations, normative political theory, and sociology. Academic law
reacted rather slowly in comparison, breaking cover in the late 1990s. A sociologist
of law, Boaventura de Sousa Santos was slightly ahead of the field with his Toward
a New Common Sense in 1995.1 The legal literature is now achieving critical mass,
1. This essay offers an approach to interpreting the growing literature on globalization and law
by looking at Rafael Domingo, 7be New Global Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2010) 212 pages. It builds on and extends two books: William Twining, General
Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) [Twining, GJP] and William Twining, Globalisation and Legal
Scholarship (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal, 2011) [Twining, GLS].
2. Quain Professor of Jurisprudence Emeritus, University CollegeLondon and Visiting
Professor, Universtiy of Miami School of Law.
3. (New York: Routledge, 1995).
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especially if one includes internal criticisms of specialist fields-notably public
international law and comparative law. These "rethinkings" have not necessarily
been attributed to globalization as such. Rafael Domingo's The New Global Lauo
provides an opportunity to reflect on some trends in the legal literature. Although
the book is part of a series the purpose of which is to clarify and improve the
theoretical foundations of international law, it has a wider significance.
The purpose of this essay is to outline a way of approaching the proliferating
literature on globalization and law. It suggests that for any book in the field one
needs to ask questions not only about its genre, provenance, and intentions, but
also about its conception of globalization and the extent to which it confronts
challenges to some widespread assumptions underlying mainstream traditions of
Western academic law. Part I below summarizes the central thesis of Domingo's book
and analyzes its main themes, Part II outlines an approach to the literature and
applies it, by way of illustration, to The New Global Law, and Part III concludes.
I. THE NEW GLOBAL LAW
A. OVERVIEW
Rafael Domingo is a Spanish professor of law with a distinguished record in
Roman law, public international law, legal history, and legal theory. His aim in
The New Global Law is to set out a vision for a new, just, and stable global order
that is coherent and feasible, but does not require a centralized world government.
He presents this vision as a specifically juridical contribution to legal science, in
particular to what can be called the "science of justice."' Domingo's key idea
is to substitute the individual human being and humankind for states as the
subjects of global law. His aspiration is for a consensual regime of global law
limited to issues that affect humanity as a whole and backed by institutions that
can make its development and administration democratic, effective, and flexible.
This aspiration is explicitly built on the world law tradition of Philip Jessup, C.
Wilfred Jenks, Alvaro d'Ors, and Harold Berman.6
4. Supra note 1.
5. Ibid at 160-61.
6. See e.g. Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956); C
Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (London, UK: Stevens, 1958); Alvaro d'Ors,
Laposesion del espacio (Madrid: Civitas, 1998); Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983);
Harold Berman, Law and Revoluiion II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the
Western Legal Traditions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
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The first part of the book takes the form of a broad historical overview of the
concept of ius gentium' "as the solitary source of global law."8 Domingo states:
The various garments in which law - fundamentally a mediator of inter-group
relationships - has been cloaked throughout history denote the various stages of
the science of law, which developed in a particular fashion during the twilight
of the Roman Republic and the dawn of the principate. Greek natural law (later
developed by Roman jurists and in Christian thought); Roman ius gentium, as
the source of inspiration in international relations; medieval ius commune-, Islamic
Siyar; vernacular variants of modernity, such as the German Vdlkerrecht, the French
droit des gens, or by the sixteenth century, the English "law of nations"; the ius
universale, international law, and the interstate law (Staatenrecht) of the rationalist
Enlightenment; and more recent descriptors, such as transnational law, the common
law of humanity, or the law of peoples - all these mark intellectual efforts directed
toward forming a more just intercommunitarian order.9
With foundations in Greek philosophy, the concept of iusgentium can be traced through
Cicero, Gaius, and Ulpian; the medieval ius commune, and Grotius, Bentham, and Kant
to a regime of law governing relations between states. From the late nineteenth
century until recently, public international law has been dominated by European
ideas and imperialism. Domingo comments on this phenomenon by saying:
After the Second World War, the conflicts of the Cold War, and the wreckage of
September 11, a new global society cries out for a law that can order it according
to its new global needs. If the ancient ius gentium served the hegemonic interests
of Rome, and international law those of state-based Europe, the new global law,
based on the person, must contribute to the common good of humanity and to the
development of world peace. The third time is the charm!"0
It is clear that Domingo's broad-brush overview is not so much potted
history as an attempt to construct a persuasive narrative that shows the continuity
of conceptions of ius gentium, each responsive to conditions of time and place,
culminating in a new crisis brought about by globalization. Each era needs its
own law: Global law is a response to the challenges of globalization.
Part I of the book starts with a critique of the present international order's
shortcomings. Globalization challenges strong ideas of sovereignty, territoriality,
precisely defined borders, and above all, states as (almost) the only subjects of
7. Loosely translated as the "law of nations" or the "law of peoples," Domingo traces the changing
meanings of the Roman concept of iusgentium through variations on the theme of law common
to all (civilized) people, in contrast to ius civile, which is the "law of the city" or "local law."
8. Supra note I at xix.
9. Ibid at 4 .
10. Ibidat 195.
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international law. For Domingo, these shortcomings stem largely from treating
the state as the foundation of public international law. "Doubtless," he writes, "the
'nation state' was a marriage of convenience that may be justified and certainly
had its reason for being. Modernity, however, has witnessed this marriage's plight
end in divorce.""
Domingo argues that in this era of globalization the once useful concepts of
territoriality and sovereignty are inadequate as foundations for a just global order.
They should be conceived as, at best, subordinate means rather than as ends. He
declares that the United Nations system has proven to be "incapable of meeting
the basic security, social, and economic needs of our world."12 Such institutions,
according to Domingo, tend to be hierarchical, bureaucratic, slow-moving,
and dominated by a few powers. 3 What is needed is a new order that avoids
these faults without moving in the direction of anarchy or "world domination
by economic imperialism or political cryptocracy."14 In a forceful analysis of
American unilateralism, hegemony, and exceptionalism, Domingo presents
American foreign policy and practice both as one of the main obstacles to creating
a just global order and as one of the main potential contributors to a new global
law. Despite recent efforts to accommodate human rights, non-state actors, and
more permeable borders, international law remains irredeemably state-centric.16
Domingo's criticisms are familiar. His approach, however, is radical in that
it presents nearly all the weaknesses as flowing from a single idea-that states are
(almost) the only subjects of international law. His solution is simple: "The human
person, and not the state, should constitute the cornerstone of global law.""
For Domingo, every living human being is a person and, crucially,
"[p]ersonhood is recognized, not granted."18 The juridical phrases "legal person"
and "legal personality" obscure the point that only human beings are real persons
and that corporations and other entities that are treated as legal subjects belong
to "a genus completely different from that of persons."1 9 Similarly, animals are
not persons." Humans belong to families, social groups, nations, and, ultimately,
11. Ibid at xx.
12. Ibidat 53.
13. Ibidat 53-54, 61-65, 89-90, 198-99.
14. Ibid at xiii.
15. Ibid at 53-54, 89-90, 198-99.
16. Ibid at 54.
17. Ibid at xvi.
18. Ibidat 126.
19. ibidat 127.
20. Ibid at 129.
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humankind as an aspirational community. However, the core unit remains the individual
human being and this, according to Domingo, should be the basis of global law.
B. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF GLOBAL LAW
Domingo categorically rejects the idea of a central world government or global
state, which would mark, in his words, "the triumph of imperialism."21 Rather,
global law will be configured as an order of consensual fundamental principles of
justice and rights that will guide and underpin the development and maintenance
of a cohesive legal order within which other legal orders will operate. Global
law will be backed by institutions-primarily a legislature and independent
judiciary-but its scope will be strictly limited to problems that affect humanity
as a whole.2 Its rule of recognition or precondition for legitimacy will be
"[q] uod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur," or "what affects everyone should
be approved by everyone."23 Global law will emerge out of, and largely replace,
international law. It will differ in being founded on the individual human person
and not being confined to relations between states. It will differ from nation-
state law in that it will be universal but not total (comprehensive), whereas state
legal systems are local but claim comprehensiveness within their territory. "The
governance ofglobalization must be marked by subsidiarity," he insists." However,
according to Domingo, states should not be the only, or even the main, loci of
governance at sub-global levels. 5
Global law is intended neither as a basis for world government nor as a
comprehensive legal system, but rather as an agreed framework of principles of
justice and rights within which other legal orders should operate. "These principles
are universal but partial.26 Domingo proposes seven principles drawn from a
central quasi-Rawlsian 7 idea of justice to shape all legal orders:
The first three -justice, reasonableness, and coercion - are common to international
law as well as global law, for they are part of the law's essence: a law that does not
serve justice, that is not rational, or that cannot be imposed coercively is simply not
21. Ibid at 172.
22. Ibid at xvii.
23. Ibid at 144.
24. Ibid at 178 [emphasis in original].
25. Ibid at 102, 180-85.
26. Ibid at 272.
27. See Rafael Domingo et al, Principios de Derecho Global: 1000 reglasy afoismosjuridicos
comentados, 2d ed (Cizur Menor: Thomson Aranzadi, 2006). See also John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, revised ed (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999) and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001).
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law. Together with these, the principles of universality, solidarity, subsidiarity, and
horizontality specify the nature of global law. These global principles are opposed
respectively to the principles of totality, individuality, centralism, and verticality,
which have been the foundation of modern international law. From each of these
principles, and especially from the proto-principle of justice, are derived many
others - the principles of property, security, legality, proportionality - that can also
affect global law.
28
Domingo devotes nearly fifty pages to expounding his own interpretations
of these principles and proto-principles, an interesting elaboration of a personal
position that is heavily influenced by both Roman law and Catholic doctrine.
2 9
This concretizes his argument and provides plenty of material for critical
discussion. What is interesting for present purposes is the idea of gaining agreement
on quite extensive working precepts as a basis for devising a new set of supra-national
institutions, including a global parliament and a global tribunal, both with limited
jurisdiction.30 The global parliament will take responsibility for regulation, in whole
or in part, of those issues that affect humanity as a whole and, to that extent
only, will limit the sovereignty of states and other legal orders. Domingo cites
the Universal Declaration ofHumai Rights1 as a rare example of the international
community taking a major step beyond traditional international law;32 one may
infer that he hopes that a similar consensus based on his foundational principles
might be reached-possibly after a major crisis. He states:
The reader must not confuse global law with a closed legal system or juridical order,
let alone a mere collection of more or less binding and sterile rules. Rather, it would
be a system of systems, a iuris ordorum ordo, which necessarily would develop into
an ordo orbis as it is gradually accepted by all communities and citizens of the world.
Its purpose would be similar to that of the sun in the solar system that is mostly
composed of planets but also of billions of smaller bodies: asteroids, meteorites,
comets, and so on.
33
Domingo posits that global law should be limited to genuinely global issues.
He says, "I understand global law to be the world legal order that governs the
ambit of justice as it affects humanity as a whole."34 The scope of global law
includes "the protection of human rights; the maintenance of peace in the world;
28. Supra note I at 157-58.
29. See Domingo et al, supra note 27.
30. Supra note 1 at 35-36, 145-46.
31. GA Res 217(111), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948) 71.
32. Supra note 1 at 36.
33. Ibid at xvii.
34. Ibid.
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the trial of international criminals; the regulation of arms, the environment, and
international commerce; the eradication of poverty are issues that affect everyone
and should be addressed by humanity as a whole."3" How global law can be strictly
limited to such issues would likely present some challenges in practice.
Domingo's carefully constructed theory of global law avoids some of the pitfalls
facing such efforts. He is not proposing a global state or a mere extension of
international law or a closed legal system, which claims comprehensiveness; nor
is he proposing universal jurisdiction or even a sharp break with existing legal
traditions. The principles on which this new kind of legal ordering would be
based would not be derived from any one belief system or ideology, but rather
would draw upon (without incorporating) natural law and different religious,
philosophical, and legal traditions.
C. DOMINGOAND RAWLS
Domingo draws extensively on Rawls's theory of justice and defines aspects of
his position in contrast to him. Both are concerned with constructing a "realistic
Utopia '3 6 based upon principles ofjustice; both are concerned with the methodology
of what Domingo calls the "science of justice;"37 and both emphasize equality
and liberty as primary values, but in different ways. For example, Domingo,
following Hart, rejects the priority of liberty.38 Both Domingo and Rawls favour
social pluralism-the co-existence of political communities based on different
religions, cultures, and arrangements.39 Domingo accepts Rawls's two principles
of justice as glossed by Alexy. 0 However, Domingo characterizes his perspective
as legal rather than political, ' 1 a distinction that is open to challenge.
Domingo and Rawls differ on the concept and role of the human person in
a theory of a just order:
The major difference between John Rawls's theory and the global principles I
propose is that Rawls's point of departure is the idea of a "moral person," whereas
mine is the person himself as a bearer of rights (the nomophor). His reinterpretation
35. Ibid at 144-45.
36. Ibid at 41.
37. Ibid at 160-61.
38. Ibid at 161.
39. Ibid at 184.
40. The two principles proposed by Alexy for resolving possible tensions between equality and
freedom, are (a) if there is no justified reason to require differential treatment, it is necessary
to seek undifferentiated treatment and (b) if there is a justified reason to seek differential
treatment, then such special treatment can be demanded. Ibid at 141.
41. Ibidat 101.
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of Rousseauian ideas about persons (men as they are), with their application first to
institutions and ultimately to peoples, is central to our differences.
42
Three points underline the significance of this difference. First, Domingo's
conception of personhood leads to a much greater emphasis on individual rights.
Second, Rawls's conception of peoples is only a short step away from his concepts
of nation and state. For Domingo, the only closed society is humankind and his
idea of political communities is much broader and more flexible than Rawls's. 3
Third, Domingo takes globalization seriously in a way that Rawls does not. " His
conception of a just global order is significantly different from Rawls's Law of
Peoples and he can be exempted from much of the criticism that this aspect of
Rawls's thought has attracted.4 1
Despite these differences, Domingo's theory of global law belongs to the same
genre as Rawls's theory of justice: It is a transcendental, universalist design theory
providing a basis for ideal just institutions. Within Western thought, it belongs to
the tradition of Kant and Locke rather than Bentham, Mill, and Hart. Whether this
makes him vulnerable to Amartya Sen's critique of transcendental institutionalism
will be considered below, in Part II Section B.
This brief summary should suffice to give an overall picture of Domingo's
vision and its connection with some familiar strands in Western academic law,
in particular Roman law, the development of the Western legal tradition,
natural law (especially in its contemporary Catholic version), human rights, and
contemporary international law. It is broadly in tune with liberal-democratic
theory." There is, of course, plenty that may be contested on particular points
within the liberal-democratic tradition. Domingo is, for instance, sharply dismissive
of Anglo-American positivism even though he draws some ideas from Hart. As
well, issues might be raised about rights-based approaches, subsidiarity, American
exceptionalism, constitutionalism, and so on. Rather than engaging with such issues
here, I shall consider the value and limitations of this general kind of proposal
from a global perspective. Writing about globalization and law is proliferating
exponentially. The purpose of the next part is to suggest one way of locating
42. Ibid at 42 [emphasis in original].
43. See e.g. ibid at 115-20.
44. See Amartya Sen, 7he Idea ofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 24-26.
45. See e.g. Allen Buchanan, "Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World"
(2000) 110 Ethics 697; Thomas Pogge, "Rawls on International Justice" (2001) 51 Phil
Qrtly 251; Ibid and Twining, GJP, supra note 1 at 159-67.
46. Supra note 1 at 157. Domingo's values are close to the cosmopolitan principles of David
Held. See e.g. David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative (Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press, 2004).
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and assessing any contribution to this literature, using The New Global Law to
illustrate the approach.
II. A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE NEW GLOBAL LAW
The proliferating literature on globalization and law hardly respects boundaries
between the two disciplines. 7 Although he acknowledges his debt to philosophers
and theologians, Domingo gives more than a hint that he assumes some notion
of the autonomy of disciplines. In any case, nearly all of his references are to legal
writers. Although the distinction between disciplines is artificial, it is convenient
here to focus on writings about globalization and law by legal scholars.48 In this
context, one can roughly distinguish between several different kinds of work:
some as contributions to legal theory;"5 some as examples of rethinking or internal
critique within a transnational field;5" some as specialist contributions to emerging
transnational fields; 51 some as explorations of the impact of globalization or
transnationalization of fields previously considered to be exclusively domestic; 52
some as writings from a "southern" perspective; 53 and some as treatises on special
topics that have become more salient.1 There is, of course, also a vast literature
47. Various specialists have written on the topic of law and globalization including sociologists,
philosophers, political scientists, economists, and historians as well as multi-disciplinary
works. See e.g. de Sousa Santos, supra note 3; Peter Singer, One World: the ethics ofglobalization,
2d ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Power
and Interdependence, 3d ed (Glenville: Longman, 2001); Joseph Stiglitz, Globalisation and
its Discontents (New York: WW Norton, 2002); Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures:
Legal Regimes in World History 1400-1900 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002); Jonas Ebbeson & Phoebe Okowa, eds, Environmental Justice in Context (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
48. There is also a growing body of practitioners' works that is not discussed here and a body of
writings that develop a particular perspective, such as feminism or post-modernism, that cuts
across traditional academic fields.
49. See e.g. Brian Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
50. See e.g. Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, eds, Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and
Transitions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
51. See e.g. Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in
Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
52. See e.g. Franklin A Gevurtz, ed, Global Issues Series (St Paul: West Academic, 2006).
53. See e.g. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); William Twining, ed, Human Rights: Southern Voices (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
54. See e.g. Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: equality government procurement and
legal change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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on regional law and regimes. TIhese examples, which are far from comprehensive,
are enough to show that this literature defies neat categorization. 5
A. LOCATING DOMINGO WITHIN THE LAW AND GLOBALIZATION LITERATURE
A good place to start is to ask, "Where is the author coming from and what is his or her
conception of the enterprise?" In Domingo's case the answer is reasonably dear.
We have seen that his academic background is in civil law, Catholic natural law, and
mainstream public international law, explicitly building on the World Law legacy
of Jessup, Jenks, and d'Ors. He draws extensively on his knowledge of Roman
law. He writes as a jurist and presents his book as a contribution to the "science
of justice," 6 which approximates to the Anglo-American category of normative
jurisprudence. He acknowledges the relevance of neighbouring fields, especially
political theory and international relations, but treats them as distinct disciplines. 7
A second preliminary question is, "What is the author's conception of
globalization?" Domingo can hardly be accused of "global neglect," 8 but he does
not explicitly discuss different conceptions and controversies about the nature of
globalization. Nevertheless, it is fairly easy to identify the outlines of his position
on these matters.
First, he adopts a broad and relatively neutral conception of globalization
as extending beyond politico-economic relations to include technology,
communications, environment, disease, terrorism, peace, and justice. In this
view, globalization is a complex social fact rather than just the kind of economic
55. Perhaps more significant is the fact that all of these examples are from the English language
literature. The New Global Law is a relatively rare example of a contemporary work about
globalization and law in a European language that has been translated into English. This
essay is linguistically parochial, but I hope that the approach suggested here can also be
applied to non-Anglophone works. This limitation is due to ignorance and I can only claim
familiarity with about a half-dozen or so relevant works, mainly in French or Italian.
56. Supra note 1 at 160-61.
57. Domingo exhibits no interest in empirical legal studies and is dismissive of utilitarianism and
legal positivism. However, he does engage with Kelsen and Hart. Of contemporary theorists
writing about globalization and law, he cites Harold Berman and Patrick Glenn but makes
no reference to Paul Berman, de Sousa Santos, Tamanaha, Teubner, Trubek, or Twining.
Interestingly, he largely ignores the writings of public international lawyers who seek to rethink
or to reform public international law from within-even the more radical ones such as Allott,
Capaldo, Franck, David Kennedy, or Koskenniemi. Nor does he cite one of the most vociferous
critics of the current international order, Rawls's pupil-turned-critic, Thomas Pogge. This list
of omissions is not intended as criticism-engaging with most of these would surely have
cluttered the book.
58. Sen, supra note 44 at 24-27, 138-4 1.
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hegemony that has been the target of the anti-globalization movement. Second,
global law is genuinely global, at least in aspiration, in that it applies and is restricted
to the world as a whole. Domingo does not fall into the trap of using global to
mean widespread or important, or merely transnational s9 Third, Domingo's gaze
is focused consistently at the global level on issues that actually or potentially
affect humankind generally. He treats detailed problems and dilemmas about the
practical operation of subsidiarity at sub-global levels as beyond his remit and he
does not go into detail about criteria for determining which matters are best dealt
with primarily at the global level. However, he is clear that the scope of global
law is quite restricted.
Thus, Domingo steers clear of most of the traps involved in the overuse and
misuse of "global," "globalization," and like terms. However, like many others, he
tends to see the world in terms of neatly layered, essentially concentric patterns.
He talks loosely of vertical and horizontal levels of governance and of moving
from the local to the global.6" He uses an analogy with geology to depict his total
picture of human relations and the principle of subsidiarity:
A basic geological principle of original horizontality, according to which layers of
rock are first deposited horizontally in an arrangement that remains fixed so long as
no other force acts upon it. This same principle can be applied to the law because
humanity also comprises different levels: personal, familial, local, regional, national,
continental, and global. We must maintain this distribution, limiting as much as
possible the use of force on its layers.6 1
This is probably overly simple as geology, it is quite misleading in respect of law. Our
heritage of legal phenomena is much messier than that. Some of the most significant
patterns relating to law are sub-global: the legacies of empires, diasporas, alliances,
trading blocs, language spread, legal traditions, criminal networks, and so on. Consider,
for example, the French empire, the Islamic umma, NATO, NAFTA, the G8, OPEC,
ASEAN, and Al Qaeda. These do not fit neat geometrical metaphors of concentric
circles, vertical hierarchies, horizontals, or diagonals, nor geological analogies of strata,
layers, or levels. Rather, they are interrelated, interacting, diffusing, and crisscrossing
in extremely complex ways. Crucially, all these examples are sub-global. There
59. However, see supra note I at 172 where he does say, "English is the most universal language."
To talk of English as the global or a universal language is descriptively an exaggeration; it may
be for the time being the most used in certain kinds of transnational relations, but only a small
proportion of the world's population (at most 10-15 per cent) have a working knowledge of it.
However, in the context, Domingo's point is that global law is, like English, universal, but partial
or, in his own words, "neither total nor absolute" at claiming exclusivity or dominance (ibid).
60. See e.g. supra note 1 at xiii, 149, 182.
61. Ibidat 182.
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never has been a world empire, a world language, a single world legal tradition, or
even a genuinely global war. Political communities, multiple individual identities,
and hybrid cultures are intimately related to such disorderly and elusive patterns.
Attempts to design workable global and transnational institutions must surely
be based on a sense of history and on information that takes into account such
complexities. From this perspective, Domingo's "new pyramid of law 62 looks
rather too neat.
B. IDEAL THEORY AND PRACTICALITY
In 2009, Amartya Sen launched a powerfd critique of transcendental institutionalism,
using Rawls as his main target. According to Sen, Rawls's theory of justice is an
arrangement-focussed rather than a realization-focussed theory concentrating
on possible transcendentally just institutions rather than being concerned with
reducing obvious injustice in the actual world in which we live. Just institutions
often produce unjust results in practice.63 Sen's concern is with a tradition of
philosophizing and economic theory that is too abstract and removed from what
actually happens.
64
As we have seen, Domingo claims to be close to Rawls. He also claims to be
realistic. Domingo is concerned with making a contribution that is practical. He
stresses that his vision is of a legal regime that is possible, not merely Utopian.6"
It does not require revolution, but rather it will evolve out of existing traditions66
and arrangements, 67 thereby maintaining continuity. Nevertheless, his is a design
theory focusing on an idealized global law as a desirable end-state for a just order
rather than providing practical guidance on solutions to immediate problems of
justice and injustice or a route map on how to move forward from the present
unsatisfactory state of affairs.
62. See ibidat 147-53.
63. Sen, supra note 44 at 75-81. The crux of Sen's critique of this kind of ideal theory is summed up as
follows: "There are ... good evidential reasons to think that none of these grand institutional
formulae typically deliver what their visionary advocates hope, and their actual success in
generating good social realizations is thoroughly contingent on varying social, economic,
political and cultural circumstances" (ibid at 83). Sen's plea is "for constant sensitivity to
what actually happens in the real world" (ibid).
64. Sen's objection is not that transcendental theory is valueless or uninteresting, but rather
that too much philosophical effort has been diverted from making useful contributions to
pressing real-world problems that are soluble. Put crudely, from a practical point of view,
ideal theory is neither necessary nor helpful. Ibid at 24-27.
65. Supra note 1 at 41, 147.
66. Ibidat 195.
67. Ibidat xviii.
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Domingo does not cite Sen, whose The Idea ofJustice8 was published only shortly
before the English translation of The New Global Law. From now on, anyone
concerned with justice and injustice needs to take account of Sen's critique of
Rawls and of his alternative vision. To be fair, Domingo cannot be accused of
"global neglect"-a charge laid by Sen against many philosophers-and his
account of global law is much more carefully worked out and persuasive than
Rawls's very disappointing Law of Peoples. Moreover, he rejects Sers view that
"an impeccably just set of institutions, even if such a thing could be identified,
would certainly demand a sovereign global state."69 My own view is that Domingo
does provide a vision of one possible aspiration and some ideas (e.g., some of
his regulae) that might be useful as working principles in negotiations towards
a reasonable political settlement. Nevertheless, his book and similar works are
vulnerable to Sen's critique of transcendental institutionalism: We have to deal
with the world as we find it.
C. THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF LAW IN THE WORLD
Domingo, like many others, is advancing proposals for the future. In an interesting
exercise on "Law of the Future and the Future of Law," the organizers of a recent
conference hosted by the Hague Institute of International Law (HiiL) have
proposed three possible scenarios that could represent dominant patterns of law
in the world in thirty years' time." These are not so much predictions as indicators
of a range of plausible possibilities extrapolated from recent trends. The authors'
starting point is the observation that there have been two major shifts in the
contemporary global legal environment: (a) from a predominantly national to
a predominantly international legal environment and (b) from a predominantly
public legal regime to a mixed public-private regime or even a predominantly
private regime.71 On the basis of this view, they envisage three broad scenarios.
1. GLOBAL CONSTITUTION
The first question reading the future global legal environments is whether international rules
and institutions furdier l d or no I the expansion of international rules and institutions
continues, we may expect that the le gal order will s owly develop as the European Union [EU] has
been developing, into a robust legal order of its own, hgh integrated with national legal systems.
68. Sen, supra note 44.
69. Ibid at 25.
70. Sam Muller et al, The Law of the Future and the Future of Law (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher, 2011).
71. Ibid.
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2. LEGAL BORDERS
If, on the other hand the process of expansion of international rules and institutions
reverses, we may expect a thickening of leal borders instead, which will then, almost
by definition, be dominated by state-ma e law (at national or regional level). This
world will probably see regional organisations emer ing as part of the development
of legal borders aimed at warding off the global lega environment.
3. LEGAL INTERNET
But, international rules and institutions can also further expand as part ofa process
of shifting emphasis from law created and enforced by state-connected institutions
to private governance mechanisms and private legal regimes. If they do, the global legaal
environment will be characterised by a growing body of international rules and
institutions with an increasingly public-private or even private nature.
72
The starting point may be controversial and the scenarios quite speculative.
A mixture of all of them is not an improbable outcome. But, as ideal types,
these are a useful device for characterizing different visions of the future of law and
prescriptions for legal development. Domingo would almost certainly accept
the first premise-a shift from a predominantly national to an international
legal environment-but might be less emphatic about a major shift to private
legal ordering. His conception of global law clearly fits the first scenario better
than the others, except that his global law would be independent of public
international law and would give less prominence to national/state legal systems.
He does not envisage a retreat towards protectionism and strengthened borders.
Although he sees lex mercatoria and arbitration as playing a significant role in
the development of global law,73 his vision fits much more closely the public law
scenario. This, interestingly, puts him in the same general area as Boaventura
de Sousa Santos74--a very different thinker who envisages the future of law as
a struggle between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces and whose hope
is for a global constitution based on democracy and human rights. As a way of
broadly characterizing visions for the future of law, the HiiL scenarios are useful,
but there are, of course, other more pessimistic or untidy possibilities.
72. Sam Muller et al, Law Scenarios to 2030: Signposting the legal space ofthefrture (The Hague:
Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, 2011).
73. Supra note I at 17-18, 112.
74. Supra note 3.
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D. SOME CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
I have argued elsewhere that globalization challenges a number of widespread but
not universal assumptions that underpin mainstream Western traditions of law. 5
Pinpointing some of these assumptions provides a template for analyzing any
contribution to inquiries and debates about globalization and law. My list is as follows:
" that law consists of two principal kinds of ordering: municipal state
law and public international law-the Westphalian duo;
* that nation-states, societies, and legal systems are largely closed,
self-contained entities that can be studied in isolation;
" that modern law and modern jurisprudence are secular and now
largely independent of their historical cultural roots in the Judaeo-
Christian traditions;
* that modern state law is primarily rational, bureaucratic, and
instrumental, performing certain functions and serving as a means
for achieving particular social ends;
* that legal phenomena are best understood through "top-down"
perspectives of rulers, officials, legislators, and elites with the points
of view of users, consumers, victims, and other subjects being at best
marginal;
* that the main subject matters of the discipline of law are ideas and
norms rather than the empirical study of social facts;
• that the modern state law is almost exclusively a Northern (European/
Anglo-American) creation, diffused through most of the world via
colonialism, imperialism, trade, and latter-day post-colonial influences;
• that the study.of non-Western legal traditions is a marginal and
unimportant part of Western academic law; and
• that the fundamental values underlying modern law are universal,
although the philosophical foundations are diverse.
This template, or something like it, can be used to test the relevance
of globalization to one's own work. The interested scholar can ask, "To what
extent do I, in my work, make working assumptions like these, and to what
extent should these assumptions be re-examined in the light of globalization?"
75. Twining, GJP, supra note 1 at 5-7. For a work addressed to the individual scholar, see also
Twining, GLS, supra note 1. My list was constructed from my study of the area and forms
the backbone of Twining, GJP, supra note 1. It does not claim to be comprehensive or
systematic and any scholar can vary it according to his or her own perspective. Resisting one
or more such challenges is always an option.
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In addition to advancing the cause of self-critical legal studies, it can be used
to assess how far an author or a particular work has addressed, or adjusted to,
challenges presented by globalization. How does The New Global Law fare in
relation to these propositions?
1. THE WESTPHALIAN DUO
Domingo explicitly rejects the assumption underlying the theories of the great
majority of Western jurists that there are only two kinds of law: the municipal
law of sovereign states and public international law in the classic sense of the
law governing relations between states. State centrism and strong conceptions
of sovereignty are among his principal targets. He explicitly recognizes non-
state law.7" His idea of global law is suigeneris, conceptually distinct from public
international law." He treats lex mercatoria and some kinds of religious laws
and custom as law, but he does not set out specific criteria of identification to
distinguish legal norms from social norms or legal orders from other normative
orders. He emphasizes Christian canon law as a source of inspiration for global
law78 and acknowledges Islamic law somewhat perfunctorily.79 Thus, Domingo
works with a broad conception of law but is not unduly concerned about the
borders of the concept.8
It is widely accepted in the jurisprudential literature that to extend the
concept of law to include, at least, some forms of non-state law leads in practice,
if not as a matter of logical necessity, to acceptance of the idea of legal pluralism,
that is of independent or semi-autonomous institutionalized normative orders
that co-exist in the same time-space context and satisfy some broad conception
of law.8 Domingo mounts a powerful attack on state centralism especially in
respect of confining law to nation-state law and restricting international law to
relations between states. He is in favour of cultural diversity (social pluralism) and
deplores the homogenizing tendencies of globalization. 82 But, he barely discusses
normative and legal pluralism. Perhaps wisely, he skirts around controversies about
76. See e.g. supra note 1 at 109-10.
77. Domingo does not explicitly treat European Union law as suigeneris. For a treatment of
EU law as sui generis, see e.g. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999) ch 9.
78. Supra note 1 at 18-19.
79. Ibidat 19-21.
80. On the limited importance of general definitions of law, see Twining, GJP, supra note 1, ch 4.
81. William Twining, "Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective" (2010) 20 Duke J
Comp & Int'l L 473.
82. Twining, GJP supra note I at 184.
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conceptualizing law. 3 On non-state law, he cites Selznick,8' Ehrlich,8 and Santi
Romano86 seemingly with approval, but he does not explore or even acknowledge
the much richer and more complex pictures of legal phenomena that emerge from
the mainstream literature on normative and legal pluralism. From this perspective,
Domingo's picture of law in the world again seems much too neat.
2. STATES AND LEGAL SYSTEMS AS SELF-CONTAINED UNITS
Domingo does not treat nation-states as closed, self-contained units. In this
respect he moves significantly beyond Rawls.87 Part of his thesis relates to the
erosion of sovereignty and the threat to the nation state, but states based on
countries will survive as one kind of political community among others.88
3. SECULARISM
Secular can mean non-religious, unreligious, or even anti-religious; it can also mean
independent from religion, as in the idea of a secular state mediating between diverse
belief systems and religious institutions or establishments. Domingo is quite explicit:
Global law is common and secular. It is common insofar as it potentially pertains
to every human being. It is also common by being compatible with the law specific
to each people and political community. And it is secular because the sources of
law are not religious.
89
A religious or confessional law is not global. However, religious traditions
can contribute significantly to the development of global law.90 Freedom of
83. However, see Rafael Domingo, Auctoritas (Barcelona: Ariel, 1999).
84. Supra note 1 at 109.
85. Ibid at 109.
86. [bid at 128.
87. Sen criticizes Rawlsian principles of justice for a number of "seriously problematic*exclusions"
including "[i]gnoring the possibly adverse effects on people beyond the borders of each
country from the actions and choices in this country, without any institutional necessity to
hear the voices of the affected people elsewhere." Sen, supra note 44 at 90.
88. Domingo, supra note 1 at 109-10, 122.
89. Supra note I at 193.
90. For example, Domingo states:
In the formation of a global law, canon law contributes more than almost anything else: the
principle of personhood against that of the state's territoriality, an appropriate combination
of the common and the local, a respect for legal sources not strictly legislative, and clear support
for principles and rules. In addition, it is a legal system that suffered none of the serious consequences
of radical legal positivism derived from excessive state involvement in juridical decisions.
Ibid at 18-19.
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religion is a first principle of global law." Domingo does not discuss the
phenomenon of contemporary religious revival, but he does not believe, as
some do, that we live in "a secular age."9 2 Clearly, he is strongly influenced
by his Catholicism. He draws extensively on canon law and papal encyclicals
as sources of inspiration, but he also acknowledges the contributions of
Greek, Roman, and medieval ideas to the past development of law and the
potential contribution of other religions. His book contains almost no serious
discussion of other religion-based orders.
4. INSTRUMENTALISM
Domingo is far from being a crude instrumentalist. 3 He rejects utilitarianism
and technocracy.' His perspective is imbricated throughout with concerns for
justice and moral values.
5. TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVES
Domingo's emphasis on subsidiarity and his insistence that the ultimate source
of law is individual human beings support his claim that he rejects "top-down
perspectives."9 " His spirit is democratic and pluralist.96 However, his point of view
is quite distant from those of victims, users, the poor, and the oppressed, who
see law in terms of other people's power, or of commentators who, in adopting
"subaltern" perspectives, present human rights and freedom as the achievement
of struggles rather than the gift of Western intellectual traditions. 7
So far, subject to a few caveats, Domingo appears to have gone a long way
towards responding to the first five challenges that globalization presents to
Western traditions of academic law. The picture changes substantially in respect
of the next four challenges.
91. lbidat 135.
92. See Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007); Charles Taylor, A SecularAge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
93. Brian Z Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Twining, GJP, supra note 1, ch 16.
94. Supra note 1 at 184-85.
95. Ibidat 180.
96. Ibidat 180-85.
97. See e.g. Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights, 2d ed (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2006); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social
Movements, and Third World Resistance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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6. IDEAS AND NORMS VERSUS EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FACTS
A crude but quite effective way of characterizing differences within Western
traditions of academic law is to suggest that nearly all legal theory and legal
scholarship can be located on a continuum stretched between two ideal types
or poles: One pole conceives of understanding law as being limited to doctrine
(concepts, rules, principles, et cetera) and the other pole focuses on the
actual operation of legal rules, institutions, processes, actors, techniques, and
consequences in the real world. Of course, sharp contrasts between doctrinal
and empirical perspectives or between the law in books and the law in action
easily descend into caricature. Few doctrinal scholars are totally indifferent to
enforcement, consequences, and what happens in practice; few, if any, empirical
legal scholars believe that concepts, rules, and principles are unimportant.
Nevertheless, there are very significant differences (not just in emphasis) along this
continuum and some of them are not obvious on the surface. For example, the
leading figures in current debates in Anglo-American legal philosophy (such as
Hart, Dworkin, Raz, and Finnis) are all very close to the doctrinal pole in that they
assume that understanding law is almost entirely a matter of understanding norms
(concepts, rules, principles, et cetera) of municipal legal systems (or the Westphalian
duo).98 This has been the dominant strand within Western traditions of academic
law. Assumption 6 on my list suggests that if one adopts a global perspective this
dominance should be challenged. To put it simply, law is a social phenomenon
and all legal systems are shaped by their political and economic context. It is not
necessary here to engage in the controversies surrounding these views. 9
It is clear that Domingo is quite close to the doctrinal pole although he
recognizes the importance of institutions and enforcement. We have already seen
in the discussions of globalization, Sen's critique of Rawls, and legal pluralism
that Domingo's vision and his conception of legal science is vulnerable to the
98. For a major exception, which is more open to issues of transnationalization and globalization
and to the idea of non-state law than most contemporary analytical legal philosophers have
been to date, see Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: an Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007). See also Makysmilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankowski, eds,
Law as Institutional Normative Order (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
99. Perhaps Montesquieu and Adam Smith deserve to be recognized as the classic Western
forerunners of this alternative tradition. See especially Charles Secondat & Baron de
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated by Thomas Nugent (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2003); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence by R Meek, PG Stein &
DD Raphael (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). On Adam Smith as a forerunner
of contextual approaches to law, see Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) ch 6.
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criticism that he underestimates the complexities of legal phenomena and of
existing sub-global patterns of our heritage of law and does not get to grips with
the practical difficulties of achieving consensus and reducing injustice.
7. EUROCENTRISM AND ETHNOCENTRISM
There is a quite widespread tendency to see both international law and the
contemporary bureaucratic states as European creations, diffused through the
world largely by colonialism, imperialism, trade, and neo-colonialism. Domingo
explicitly recognizes classical public international law as a Eurocentric creation"'
and argues that global law must develop away from this. He does not say much
about the diffusion of law, surely now a central topic in considering law from a
global perspective. He acknowledges his European training and education but
claims not to be Eurocentric. 11
None of us can escape entirely from our intellectual roots and Domingo
aspires to adopt a genuinely global perspective. However, some will feel that his
interpretations of history, his treatment of religions other than Christianity, and
his very limited acknowledgement of non-Western legal traditions suggest that he
has not escaped very far. His argument suggests that global law, for the benefit
of all humankind, will evolve out of an essentially European heritage, including
building on the EU, without much reference to the interests, views, cultures, and
traditions of the rest of the world (with the possible exception of the United States
provided that it abandons its unilateralist and exceptionalist pretensions). That is a
recognizable point of view, but it hardly represents a genuinely global perspective.
8. UNIVERSALISM AND BELIEF PLURALISM
Underlying Western traditions of law are some very strong strands of universalism
in ethics: Natural law, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and some theories of human
rights have been universalist in tendency, claiming to apply to all human beings
at all times and in all places. Of course, universalism is an elusive concept, 12 but
most such theories allow some space for particularities of culture, conditions,
and traditions. However, if one adopts a genuinely global perspective, one is
confronted with an almost inescapable fact:"0 3 There exists a diversity of belief
systems, cosmologies, values, and ethical views that are extensive, deep-rooted,
100. See e.g. supra note 1 at 25.
101. Ibidatxxiii.
102. Twining, GJP, supra note 1 at 127-29.
103. I say "almost" because there are some who believe that the existence of universal values and
beliefs can be demonstrated empirically. I do not enter into this controversy here.
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and not likely to be amenable to forming the basis for a consensus arrived at
by rational debate and persuasion."' If one accepts that such belief pluralism
exists and is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, then one of the major
challenges facing humankind is how to construct frameworks, institutions,
processes, and norms that support co-existence and co-operation to a reasonable
extent. Put thus, the way forward looks more like a political process of negotiation
and setdement than like an arrival at a consensus on values and principles.
Any work that seeks to present recommendations about the future ordering of
the world has to confront this problem and, indeed, a great deal of contemporary
Western ethical and political theory treats it as a central concern. It is not entirely
easy to locate a thinker like Domingo in relation to this. He has his own religious
and ethical commitments, but he recognizes that these cannot, on their own, be
the basis for his argument. He seems quite optimistic about reaching a strong,
if not universal, acceptance of his foundational principles of global law and he
can point to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Millennium
Development Goals,"" 5 among others, as examples of such achievements, despite
the cynicism that they attract in some quarters.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this essay has been to illustrate one way of getting to grips with the
growing literature on globalization and law. The New Global Law is in many ways
an admirable book. It is a reflective, coherent, clear, and forthright statement
of a possible scenario for the future of law in the world, which many may find
attractive-a new world legal order built on principles of dignity and justice
with limited central institutions and clear guidelines and meeting (a) some major
criticisms of the present regime of institutions and public international law; (b) an
alternative to anarchy, or imperial domination, or kleptocracy; and (c) a carefully
thought out but flexible body of guiding principles as a basis for discussion or
negotiation. The New Global Law provides illuminating links to Roman law
scholarship and contemporary continental thought about globalization that is not
available in English. If some of my analysis suggests that it fails to confront some
of the challenges of globalization to our heritage of legal scholarship, this signals
limitations that are widely shared by a literature that generally underestimates the
extent and significance of these complex and bewildering processes.
104. Twining, GJP supra note 1 at 131.
105. Supra note 1 at 36.

